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Richard Toye                             St. John's College, Cambridge 
 
'The adoption of my plan would require the approval of the Labour 
Party. But they will never be asked to approve inflation. It will just happen.' 
 
- John Maynard Keynes, The Times, 28 November 1939 
 
John Maynard Keynes's war-time proposals for compulsory saving or 'deferred pay', 
developed between October 1939 and February 1940, generated massive public 
controversy; indeed, Keynes himself judged that in terms of space and universality of 
comment, the publicity aroused was considerably greater in volume than that caused 
by his Economic Consequences of the Peace two decades earlier.2 Yet whereas 
historians have pored in detail over the origins of Keynes's General Theory (and over 
the Labour Movement's reaction to it),3 the evolution of his original compulsory 
savings plan into the minor economic classic How to Pay for the War has been much 
neglected by comparison. In particular, Keynes's attempts to solicit support from the 
Labour Movement for his scheme have received virtually no attention. This is 
surprising, as his attempts to accommodate Labour opinion were a key factor in 
shaping the final outcome of his thought. But Labour's role in the affair also has a 
wider interest, for the movement's attitude to the plan provides a snapshot of socialist 
economic thought during the period of the Phoney War. Keynes injected further social 
radicalism into his plan in order to make his more plan attractive to Labour; Labour 
neither reciprocated the spirit of his concessions, nor accepted the consumer choice 
philosophy upon which the plan's main principle was based. 
 
Of the published material that relates to How to Pay for the War, the documents 
assembled in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXII form an 
essential starting point.4 However, references to Keynes's attempts to court the Labour 
Movement are largely restricted to the accounts he gave of his experiences in letters to 
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Harold Laski  (28 January 1940) and Geoffrey Dawson (11 March 1940).5 The best 
secondary accounts of the evolution of Keynes's proposals are undoubtedly those of 
Donald Moggridge; but although Moggridge notes the economist's contacts with 
different Labour groups and individuals, and the opposition to the scheme of TGWU 
leader Ernest Bevin, his discussion of Labour's part in the affair remains somewhat 
cursory, although its importance is acknowledged to a degree.6 Equally, Keynes's first 
biographer, Roy Harrod, noted that his 'scheme was in essence an attempt to woo 
Labour to accept voluntarily an ordered plan for preventing a rise in purchasing power 
in lieu of ...open inflation,' but went into little more detail.7 Donald Winch's account of 
the proposals gives the barest mention of Keynes's desire to secure the goodwill of the 
trade unions.8 Nor have more general chroniclers of war-time politics treated the 
question in much depth. Paul Addison's The Road To 1945 mentions Bevin's hostility; 
Stephen Brooke's Labour's War devotes a paragraph to the Labour Party's attitude to 
Keynes's scheme.9 There is, however, a wealth of unpublished documents which 
makes possible a more detailed consideration of the issue. Principally, this consists of 
material in the Keynes Papers. This includes correspondence between Keynes and a 
number of  Labour figures (notably Clement Attlee,  F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, G.D.H. 
Cole, Ellen Wilkinson and Laski) as well as his hand-written notes for speeches given 
to various groups including the Fabian Society and the National Trade Union Club.10 
There is also preserved in the Walter Citrine Papers a thirty page record of Keynes's 
meeting with TUC leaders in January 1940, which, importantly, reveals not only what 
he himself said but how the trade unionists responded.11 The records of the Labour 
Party committees which deliberated on the Keynes Plan are also illuminating. 
 
How to Pay for the War was not merely an exercise in war finance. It is generally seen 
in theoretical terms both as an important step in the development of national income 
accounting in Britain, and as an application in reverse of the principles of the General 
Theory, dealing with excessive, as opposed to deficient, demand.12 But its significance 
in political practice, as opposed to economic theory, has scarcely been considered, an 
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omission this article sets out to remedy. First, the relationship between Keynes and the 
Labour Movement before 1939 is examined. Then, Keynes's initial proposals, and 
Labour's reaction to them, are elucidated. His meetings with the Labour Party Front 
Bench, a committee of the TUC, and the Fabian Society are detailed, as are Labour 
reactions to his thus conditioned final proposals. The deliberations of the Labour Party 
committee that ultimately rejected the plan are examined. Finally, consideration is 
given to Moggridge's contention that Keynes's lobbying on the war finance issue 
represented 'the most sophisticated and successful of his many campaigns as a 
publicist'.13 
 
Keynes and the Labour Movement before 1939 
 
The relationship between Keynes and the Labour Movement never ceased to be one of 
ambivalence. The former despised the latter's class basis and the supposed intellectual 
inferiority of its leaders, whilst trade unionists were deeply suspicious of an academic 
with no experience of working class life, and socialists were allergic to Keynes's aim 
of restoring the vitality of capitalism. Nevertheless, the inter-war period did see a very 
gradual thawing of relations. During the 1920s he was actively committed on behalf of 
the Liberal Party, although doubtful about its leadership and programme. In 1924 he 
dismissed the other parties with the comment that 'by reason of the old-fashioned 
dogmas and the class-interests they are compelled to serve, neither Socialists nor 
Tories are likely to do anything sensible and effective in the near future.'14 The Labour 
Party was a class party, he wrote the following year, and its class was not his class: 'I 
can be influenced by what seems to me to be justice and good sense; but the class war 
will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie.'15  
 
Only after the debacle of the 1931 General Election did Keynes abandon the Liberals, 
now fractured and chronically diminished, for good. The Labour Party, he concluded, 
although reduced to a mere 52 Commons seats in the face of the National 
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Government's landslide, nonetheless represented 'the only organised body of opinion 
outside the National Government, and which will therefore be called on some day, 
presumably, to form an alternative government.'16 Accordingly, he began to proffer 
advice, suggesting, with perhaps an excess of subtlety, that Labour should seek new 
notions of what was meant by 'economically sound', as well as venturing rather more 
down-to-earth constructive criticism of its new programme.17 Although still prevented 
from joining the party by what he saw as, on the one hand, the timidity of Labour's 
leaders, and, on the other, the extremism of their followers, in the General Election of 
1935 he supported Labour.18 But this hardly amounted to a full-scale rapprochement. 
 
The Labour Party, too, kept its distance. The upheaval of 1931 led it to adopt policies 
of physical planning based on nationalisation which were in many respects antithetical 
to Keynes's conceptions of economic management. The How to Pay for the War 
controversy would in time give stark illustration of this disparity. Thus although, 
during the thirties, young Labour economists such as Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay and 
James Meade took an enthusiastic interest in Keynes's ideas, this had no significant 
impact upon the party's official programme, even after the publication of the General 
Theory. Expansionary policies, where mentioned at all, remained a mere lubricant 
which might serve to smooth the transition to an overwhelmingly physically planned 
'socialist commonwealth'.19 
 
The ideological gap, however, is not the sole explanation for Labour's failure to adopt 
the policies that Keynes would have wished. The economist's personality proved a 
stumbling block to warmer relations with the Labour Movement. In the early thirties 
he enlisted the support of Francis Williams, City Editor of the Daily Herald and a 
member of Labour's 'XYZ' group of financial experts, in order to help persuade the 
party of his ideas: 'but not to much avail. Whenever Keynes actually met Labour or 
trade-union leaders he managed to insult them.'20 In particular, relations with his 
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former pupil Hugh Dalton, the man with perhaps the greatest influence over Labour's 
economic programme, were always cool.21  
 
Furthermore, as Moggridge notes, Keynes' 1930s appointments diaries 'are singularly 
free of entries suggesting meetings with the emerging generation of senior Labour 
politicians.'22 Of course, in the latter part of the decade, illness led to enforced 
inactivity; he had to restrict his engagements, especially those outside Cambridge, in 
1937 declining an invitation to lecture to the Fabian Society for this reason.23 But it is 
almost as though, having reached his famous conclusion to the General Theory that 'it 
is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good and evil',24 he was content 
to sit back and let his ideas do their own 'dangerous' work. This attitude of benevolent 
neglect kept him out of the Labour Movement's political backrooms in pre-war days, 
in stark contrast to his later attitude in 1939-40. Then, as a vigorous advocate of his 
own war-finance plan, he was not afraid to dirty his hands: he would be prepared to 
court the 'vested interests' in the Labour Party and the unions, and would be prepared 
to alter his ideas substantially if so doing would secure their acceptance. 
 
The Times articles 
 
Keynes first turned his mind to the twin problems of war-finance and inflation in 
October 1939, giving a lecture on the subject to the Marshall Society in Cambridge on 
the 20th of that month under the title 'War Potential and War Finance'.25 His strategy 
for gaining the proposals' acceptance was not to appeal to public opinion directly, but 
to persuade representative political leaders of their virtue.26 He thus sent a long 
memorandum encapsulating the ideas in his lecture to a number of eminent persons 
including Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon and Labour Party leader Clement 
Attlee: it was entitled 'The Limitation of Purchasing Power: High Prices, Taxation and 
Compulsory Savings'. He subsequently divided the memorandum in two, and wrote in 
a little extra length to make it suitable for publication in The Times on consecutive 
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days; he also omitted the original suggestion that the purchasing power of the 
proposed compulsory savings should be guaranteed on the grounds that it would 
distract discussion from the main plan.27  
 
As published, on 14 and 15 November, under the title 'Paying For The War', the 
articles highlighted the need to restrain working-class consumption during war-time in 
order to avoid inflation: 
 
 Nothing is more certain that the wages bill of this country will increase...Thus 
 the working classes will have a substantially larger money income than before, 
 but they must not, at the best, consume any more than they did. For the wise 
 and just solution of this problem the leaders of the working class must be 
taken  into earnest and sincere consultation. 
 
Keynes dismissed both rationing and anti-profiteering measures as 'pseudo-remedies'. 
The former, against a backdrop of a general increase in purchasing power, would 
simply divert demand from the rationed to the unrationed article, and ignored differing 
consumer preferences; the latter 'exalts into undue prominence the least significant 
cause of rising prices.' He therefore turned to what he saw as the three genuine ways 
of restoring equilibrium between supply and demand. The first was inflation. To some 
extent this was both inevitable and desirable, but to rely on it alone would be to invite 
a 'vicious spiral' of prices and wages. The second remedy was taxation. Yet, not only 
was it impossible to finance the war entirely out of current taxation without 
borrowing, 'But to help solve our present problem it must involve taxation of the 
working classes' as it was they who did three-fifths of the nation's consuming, and it 
was their incomes which were expected to rise. Thus, 'The price remedy and the 
taxation remedy are alike in depriving the working class of any benefit from their 
increased earnings. Yet a large portion of the earnings now in question represents 
increased effort on their part.' But if it were physically impossible for the community 
at war to reward this increased effort by immediate consumption - and if immediate 
consumption might in fact have to be reduced - there was no reason why it should not 
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be rewarded by a claim on future resources. This 'deferred payment' was Keynes' third, 
and preferred, remedy. 
 
The detail of his plan was that a percentage of all incomes in excess of a stipulated 
minimum income would be paid over to the Government, partly as compulsory 
savings and partly as direct taxes, on a steeply graduated scale. Some of this amount 
would be credited to the individual in the Post Office Savings Bank, the balance being 
used to discharge his or her tax liabilities, if any. The sums thus credited would carry 
two-and-a-half per cent interest, and would be blocked for most purposes. They would 
be unblocked and made freely available to the holder, probably by a series of 
instalments, at some date after the war, thus helping the country through the 
anticipated post-war slump. 'All methods of war finance are open to objections,' 
Keynes wrote pointedly, 'But this new one offers some positive advantages which will 
not go unnoticed, I hope, by the leaders of the Labour Party.' And he finished: 'If the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer does not deliberately choose a positive method he will 
inevitably slip into inflation merely by hesitating.'28 
 
The first phase of Keynes's public campaign was shortly afterwards concluded when 
he published an article in the December 1939 issue of the Economic Journal 
providing the statistical basis for an estimate of  the required scale of compulsory 
savings;29 much of it was based on pre-war research conducted by Colin Clark, a 
Cambridge economic statistician with long-standing ties to the Labour Movement. 
Meanwhile, Keynes was being 'overwhelmed with a volume of criticism and 




From the outset, Keynes had attached much importance to the acquiescence of the 
Labour Movement in his scheme. In sending Attlee his original memorandum, he had 
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written: 'the way in which [the plan] strikes the Labour leaders is obviously vital...for 
my part, I believe that it presents the only way of handling the financial end of the war 
in a way that is at the same time just and advantageous to the working-class.' He also 
offered to hold up publication in The Times, in the hope, as he told Harold Laski, that 
he might be able to adapt the proposal to the feelings of the Labour leaders.31 Attlee, 
who Keynes believed had not fully understood the plan, replied that 'To take my own 
case...Your scheme would impose upon me an amount of compulsory saving which 
would be crushing.'32 ('No comment whatever on the relation of my scheme to the 
working class', Keynes noted drily.33) Keynes wrote a long letter back, answering 
questions of detail raised by Attlee, and adding:  
 
 The question is, do you prefer to be mulcted in the alternative ways? [i.e. 
 taxation or inflation]...Now it is not the slightest good your saying that you 
 cannot afford any of them. You have got to suffer the reduction one way or 
 another. The question is which way you prefer.34 
 
The response to this was typically Attlee-esque and curt: 'I was not, of course[,] 
dealing with the general issues raised by your proposal, but only trying to elucidate its 
exact basis.'35 Keynes nonetheless waited another fortnight before he went ahead and 
published in The Times. Thus, when Harold Laski accused him of approaching the 
Labour leadership in a way calculated to cause them offence, he was able to defend 
himself fully; Laski was forced to admit that he had 'a good alibi'.36 
 
By contrast, one prominent Labour leader appears to have behaved very badly in the 
affair. On 17 November, two days after Keynes' second article appeared, a piece was 
published in the Daily Express under the by-line of Arthur Greenwood, the Labour 
Party's Deputy Leader. The Express, under Lord Beaverbrook's proprietorship, was at 
this time running a violent laissez-faire campaign against rationing and all forms of 
central control. The article in question was called 'Good enough for Hitler's workers - 
but not good enough for ours, Mr. Keynes...': 'If Mr. Keynes' plan is adopted its 
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principles will be established - and the temptation to raid the pockets of the poor will 
be far too alluring to be resisted', it read. '...This proposal goes beyond anything we 
have tolerated in this country since democracy was established here.'37 It is hardly 
surprising that Keynes had 'seldom suffered a greater disappointment' than when 
reading this.38 But Greenwood's real offence was not in the views expressed, or the 
manner of their expression (which Keynes was prepared to overlook), but in the fact 
that they were apparently not his views at all. As New Statesman editor Kingsley 
Martin reported to Keynes, once the latter had written to Greenwood correcting 
misapprehensions contained in the Express article and offering to meet: 
 
 I have now heard the interesting story of your correspondence with 
 Greenwood...The Express article was written for him; he had no idea what it 
 was all about...He went into the Herald office in some perplexity about your 
 letter, not knowing what to answer because he had not even read your 
 articles.39 
 
This story lacks corroboration; but, if true, it would certainly explain why Keynes' 
letter to Greenwood received no direct reply. And, if true, the scandal was 
compounded by the fact that Greenwood would have received a substantial fee for the 
article he hadn't written. 'You accused me of lack of tact in approaching the Labour 
leaders', Keynes retorted to Laski, 'It appears that Beaverbrook understands the right 
technique better than I do.'40 
 
The response of other Labour leaders was also disappointing to Keynes. F. W. 
Pethick-Lawrence had been Financial Secretary to the Treasury in the second Labour 
government, and held the status of 'financial expert' within the Labour Party; by 
coincidence, he had been the examiner for the Tomline mathematics prize won by 
Keynes whilst at Eton.41  The two men were friendly; but Pethick-Lawrence now 
wrote a long article attacking the notion of compulsory saving, which appeared in the 
socialist weekly Forward on 25 November. He agreed with Keynes that the war 
necessitated much abstinence from non-essential expenditure, but 
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 at present there area million-and-a-half people unemployed, and it is unsound 
 economy to forego expenditure, with the result that more people are thrown 
 out of work until the tide of war expenditure has risen and is ready to absorb 
 them. 
 
Moreover, the enormous variation in individual circumstances meant that voluntary 
rather than compulsory saving was desirable, if the latter could possibly be avoided: 
this trust in good sense and patriotism was 'in accordance with the genius of our 
people', upon whom it was unnecessary to impose 'a rigid scale of forced loans.' And 
finally, 'statesmen and economists cannot expect the workers to make new and 
unprecedented sacrifices until they are prepared to impose a special tax on capital 
wealth.'42 He also sent these views to Keynes direct, after receiving an initial letter 
from the economist advocating his scheme and conveying disappointment at 
Greenwood's article.43 
 
In peacetime Keynes would have naturally concurred with Pethick-Lawrence's 
sentiment that it was wrong to try to deflate the economy in conditions short of full 
employment. But the situation had now altered fundamentally, or was about to. 
Keynes had, in a third Times article responding to his critics (published on 28 
November), pointed out that heavy government expenditure combined with large-
scale unemployment was a situation that could not long persist.44 This he also pointed 
out to Pethick-Lawrence directly in the first part of December. Moreover, he insisted 
that his plan was flexible, and asked for input from Labour: 
 
 The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that something of the kind 
I  suggest is required by the interests of the working class. But, of course, it is 
 capable of all sorts of variants, and can be protected by many safe-guards. I 
 wish you and your colleagues would prepare your own plan, absorbing so 
 much of mine as you find serviceable.45 
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He had some grounds for optimism on this score, in that Pethick-Lawrence was trying 
to arrange for him to meet the Labour Party Front Bench early in the New Year.46 But, 
more ominously, Ernest Bevin now seemed to set his face against the scheme. 
 
As the leader of Britain's largest union, Bevin was both highly influential within the 
Labour Movement and an industrial force in his own right. His attitude to the Keynes 
Plan was thus of vital importance. He did not yet condemn it explicitly; but by the turn 
of the year his likely opposition could perhaps have been surmised. The root of the 
difficulty was that he was determined to resist all reductions in working class living 
standards, and if possible to fight for improvements. Poor relations between the 
Chamberlain Government and the TUC did not help, for there was a frequent tendency 
on the Left, to which Bevin may have fallen victim, to see Keynes as the dupe of 
capitalists determined to use the war as an excuse to soak the workers. On 29 
December he wrote (in a letter subsequently seen by Keynes, who thought it 'Almost 
the worst thing I have read since the beginning of the war'): 
 
 My time has been taken up in trying to get wages commensurate with the cost 
 of living. I am determined to try to keep them up to a proper level. The powers 
 that be have won in the first round but that is only a temporary victory for 
 them. As our people sicken of this business they will revolt against the 
 depression of  their standards.47 
 
When Chamberlain, in his Mansion House speech of 9 January 1940, argued that it 
would be a mistake to tie wages to the cost of living,48 Bevin reacted angrily. 'The 
policy of the Government as I see it,' he told the Daily Herald, 'is to talk about 
sacrifices by people who had nothing to sacrifice when the war started.' 
 
 Of those wage-earners to whom Mr. Chamberlain talks of sacrifice, 90 per 
 cent. were on wage standards that left no margin. 
 
 To reduce their purchasing power...only reduces the efficiency standard of the 
 people, and such a policy can only result, if this war lasts a long time, in 
 outbreaks of labour troubles of a serious character.49 
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This was fighting talk, perhaps motivated by the desire to outflank militant opposition 
to the TUC leadership;50 but Keynes believed that Bevin's 'bark is often worse than his 
bite, and I should not yet despair of getting him round to some sort of rational 
scheme.'51 Yet Bevin chose, for the time being, to remain aloof from direct discussion 
of Keynes's proposals. 
 
The Daily Herald itself  had claimed, soon after the plan’s publication, that it “has not 
found much favour in either official or unofficial circles”, the latter category 
presumably including the Labour Party.
52
 The City Editor of Tribune believed that 
Keynes had developed a 'most original and unorthodox' plan for cheating the working 
class.53 Yet Keynes was not entirely without allies within the Labour Movement. One 
of these was Harold Laski, stalwart of the Left on the party's Executive, who himself 
admitted he was no economist but admired the Times articles for their persuasive 
effect.54 Once Keynes had related to him the story of his travails with Attlee and 
Greenwood, Laski withdrew the charge that he had been tactless in approach, and 
undertook to stimulate discussion of the plan within the NEC.55 Another sympathiser 
was G.D.H. Cole, whose New Fabian Research Bureau had been through the thirties 
Labour's most fertile ground for economic discussion. On 6 January 1940, an 
(unsigned) article by him in the New Statesman commended the scheme, albeit 
because his preferred alternative, 'a Socialist system of production and distribution' 
was excluded by the political situation at the time.56 But neither of these men was in 
the first rank of influence. Attlee, although perhaps fond of Laski, as time passed 
found him progressively more irritating, in 1945 delivering the immortal rebuke 'a 
period of silence on your part would be welcome.'57 Nor was Cole much in official 
favour. He told Keynes at the end of January that he had heard nothing from either the 
TUC or the Labour Party: 'Possibly I am too much in disgrace to be consulted, on 
account of my Popular Front activities.'58 Thus lacking powerful advocates in the 
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Labour Movement, it was logical for Keynes himself to seek to meet groups within it 
face to face. 
 
Keynes meets the Labour Front Bench 
 
By the end of November 1939 Keynes was receiving suggestions that he should 
reprint his Times articles and his forthcoming Economic Journal article as a single 
pamphlet, but thought that such a publication would be 'rather a mess.'59 Determining 
to rework the material into a more coherent whole, which might be published after 
Christmas, his changes were not, however, to be merely stylistic. This would be his 
chance to remould his proposals into a form more acceptable to the Labour 
Movement. Having made the  cosmetic (if psychologically significant) change in title 
from 'compulsory saving' to 'deferred pay' in early December, three of his four 
substantive alterations to the scheme were in place by 22 January, perhaps earlier.60 
'For my own part,' he wrote, 'I cannot but believe that the revised version ought to be 
outrageously attractive to the Labour Party.'61 
 
On 24 January he met the Labour Party Front Bench in the morning and a committee 
of the TUC General Council in the afternoon. Keynes's new scheme, which he now 
presented, attempted to meet previous criticism in several ways. To begin with, there 
was no longer any hint that working-class consumption would be reduced; the aim 
was now merely to hold it level. Moreover, Keynes now 'fell in love with his own 
scheme as a method of social reform' (Harrod).62 His plan, he told Lord Stamp, was 
'now not merely a piece of technique, but aims...for a bigger move towards equality 
than any we have made for a long time.'63 Accordingly, he proposed a system of family 
allowances of five shillings per child under fifteen; thus a married man with two 
young children would actually have more left in cash for all rates of earnings up to 
nearly 75 shillings, and would accumulate substantial deferred pay too. In all, the 
scheme would provide the working classes with better security against misfortunes, 
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and with increased wealth, 'for a right to deferred consumption is precisely what 
wealth is.'64 
 
Moreover, he now suggested that accumulated credits could be repaid - the security of 
the savings being a perennial Labour concern - via a post-war capital levy. This idea 
came directly from F.A. von Hayek, who had raised it in the Spectator in November,65 
but Keynes had good reason to think it would find Labour approval. A capital levy 
had been official party policy in the immediately post-1918 years, but was later 
discarded by Labour's then leaders as an electoral liability. In the April 1939 the young 
Labour economists Douglas Jay, Hugh Gaitskell and Evan Durbin suggested the party 
call for 'Conscription of Wealth'; if the government accepted this, Labour should 
accept the principle of military conscription in return. This plan for a special defence 
levy was supported by Attlee and Dalton, but rejected by the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, which still opposed the call-up and hence the proposed quid pro quo.66 But the 
idea of an emergency tax on wealth was quickly resurrected. After the outbreak of 
war, most Labour thinkers who did not favour compulsory saving advanced a year-on-
year capital tax as an alternative. Keynes was certain this would 'not do what we want, 
which is a reduction of current consumption rather than a transfer of capital assets to 
the Treasury';67 but a post-war levy was a different question. The other new touch was 
that deferred pay would now be handed over by employers to trade union friendly 
societies, and administered by them, which would help alleviate the oft expressed fear 
that the state, or employers, would refuse to hand the workers' savings back to them 
after the war was over.68 
 
The only record of what happened when this scheme was presented to the Labour 
Front Bench is Keynes's own. He told Harold Laski the meeting was 'satisfactorily 
non-committal on the whole, but it could scarcely be regarded as a serious discussion 
of the business': 
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 Of those there Attlee and [H.B.] Lees-Smith [MP] ran away after about quarter 
 of an hour, saying nothing, but I thought Attlee was obviously extremely 
 hostile. Dalton stayed on, friendly and non-committal, saying at the end that he 
 had been against the plan, but was now at least to some extent shaken and 
 prepared to consider it. [John] Wilmot [MP], whom I did not know before, 
was  clearly  an enthusiastic supporter and said that he was 100 per cent converted. 
 Most of the actual discussion was between myself and Pethick-Lawrence, who 
 was, as usual, candid and delightful, but seemed to want a terrible lot of 
 breaking in if  he was to contemplate a new idea. He vehemently advocated 
 voluntary saving on general principles of extreme laissez-faire...I assaulted 
him  vigorously and, though perhaps I flatter myself, I really think he was at the end 
 just beginning to see the point. But I rather felt...that I was up against such a 
 terrific degree of nineteenth century laissez-faire, that the discussion was more 
 of historical than  current interest.69 
 
Keynes meets the TUC 
 
Keynes's meeting with the TUC later that day was, from his point of view, rather more 
satisfactory. This was in spite of the fact that TUC General Secretary Walter Citrine 
was absent in Finland, and that Bevin, as Keynes believed, had 'carefully arranged not 
to be on the Committee' in question.70 (That committee, moreover, had already cast 
doubt on the practicability of Keynes's scheme, preferring rationing and price control, 
and had accordingly received endorsement for its view from Dalton and Pethick-
Lawrence.71) Keynes now began by explaining his new proposals to the gathering. Not 
only did he have to think about the technical problem of how to finance the war 
without inflation, but 'He felt that there was here an opportunity for getting a big 
constructive working class policy...The time of war might be just the moment for 
getting some things they could not easily get in time of peace.'72 He then went on to 
outline, at somewhat greater length, the written scheme he had circulated to the 
committee. At two significant points, however, he diverged from it. 
 
At the point where Keynes was elucidating his capital levy idea, an unidentified 
person interjected 'capital tax': 'Mr. Keynes said that he, personally, very much agreed 
on that'. He continued: 
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 they had talked after the last war of a capital levy in the form of instalments, 
 and that would create the machinery for a capital tax. A capital tax should be 
 part of  their fiscal machinery...If, of course, it was paid by instalments they 
 could ultimately have its place taken by a permanent capital tax.73 
 
This was, to say the least, a radical suggestion, which duly took its place in How to 
Pay for the War. The General Theory; had famously advocated 'the euthanasia of the 
rentier'; its author now advanced a practical proposal for achieving that end. Keynes 
was thus both genuinely passionate for social reform and willing to emphasise the 
'socialist' aspect of his thought in order to accommodate Labour and trade union 
opinion. 
 
The second divergence was on the question of rationing, something he hadn't put on 
paper 'because it was of necessity controversial, and not of the essence of the scheme': 
 
 There was a good case for sugar and butter rationing but when they got to 
 general rationing its result would be to destroy consumer's [sic] choice. 
 
 It had been said you had either to tighten up the pocket  or the pantry...He was 
 all for the pocket and not the pantry...Once they had constricted the pocket 
 they were coming on to the moment when they could have a Government 
 scheme. 
 
Keynes said such a scheme should consist of a narrow list including necessities made 
into a Ministry of Labour cost of living index. The authorities should then undertake 
to do their utmost (probably via food subsidies) to prevent the prices on that list from 
rising 'something which he thought would only be operative if the list was small.'74 
This would shortly after harden into his final acceptance of the 'iron ration' proposal 
put forward by Sir Arthur Salter, R.H. Brand and J.R. and Ursula Hicks; he eventually 
chose to favour this course even though, as he had previously admitted, 'As an old 
Treasury man I am scared of it' on grounds of expense.75 
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After Keynes had finished his presentation, the trade unionists asked him many small 
questions of detail. At one point, in response to the suggestion that the scheme helped 
families at the expense of single men, he quipped that he 'thought it was the policy of 
the trade unions never to admit that a man had less than three children!'76 He also went 
on to say he felt that the unions had been perfectly right in saying that it was not their 
position to put forward a scheme, but that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should do 
so. But when he reflected on the present Chancellor it became clear that the initiative 
would have to come from elsewhere: he 'had to confess he was pinning more hope on 
them [the TUC] than on the Chancellor'.77 
 
  
Keynes later told Laski that whilst the trade unionists 'were extraordinarily careful to 
commit themselves to nothing, I felt the atmosphere most friendly, and above all 
serious and intelligent.'78 Of those present, those most apparently enthusiastic for the 
scheme were George Hicks, the leader of the builders' union and a Labour MP, and 
John Marchbank, General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen. There 
were sceptical views expressed too. G.W. Thomson of the Association of Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen suggested that the value of the deferred pay was likely 
to be eradicated by future inflation, and when Keynes responded that their value 
would  be written up accordingly, argued 'it was impossible to conceive any 
Government doing this.'79 Returning to the theme a little later, Keynes admitted 'He 
thought they would find it extraordinarily difficult to get an assurance' from the 
Treasury on these lines.80 
 
In a lengthy summing up, George Woodcock, the Secretary of the TUC's Research and 
Economic Department, said that the problem as a whole, from the unions' point of 
view, was not an entirely economic question: 'They might accept completely all the 
economic points, but it did not necessarily solve their problems.'"81 In other words, 
there were issues of political palatability at stake as well as the mere technical 
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question of restraining inflation - precisely the issues that Keynes had sought to 
address when including in his proposals social reform 'sweeteners' like family 
allowances, which were independent of his technique for paying for the war. 
Woodcock further believed that the 'moral influence' of the trade union movement in 
persuading people to save voluntarily should not be underestimated, but also 
wondered whether Keynes' scheme should not be made more stringent.82 The 
distinguished visitor was much impressed.83 
 
Finally, Keynes made a suggestion: 
 
 the memo. which he had circulated was just an extract from the pamphlet 
which  he was writing, and which he would finish in about ten days. He was willing to 
 hold up publication of that until the [General] Council had discussed the 
 matter, and if they felt and were satisfied to work for anything on that line, he 
 would be content to abandon the field rather than butt in on his own. He would 
 much rather hand over to them the results of his thinking up to date, or assist 
in  any way, rather than put it as an individual. He had no pride in authorship.84 
 
Although the TUC 'deeply appreciated the extreme generosity of your offer' they 
nonetheless refused it;85 that it was made at all was yet another indication of Keynes' 
willingness at this time not only to be flexible in his ideas, but to do everything he 
could in order to see them accepted by the Labour Movement. His campaign now 
continued accordingly.  
 
Keynes meets the Fabian Society 
 
By the time that Keynes addressed the Fabian Society at London's Royal Hotel at 
lunchtime on 21 February, his new booklet was ready, and proof copies were being 
received by those he sought to convert.86 Having traded titles with his publisher 
Harold Macmillan ranging from the dull Savings and Inflation to The Economic 
Consequences of War, he had at last settled on How to Pay for the War: A Radical 
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Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His substantive proposals were thus in their 
final form, the 'iron ration' idea now being definitely included. He told the Fabians: 
 
 I am a highly teachable person. I learn from criticism and before now have laid 
 myself open to the reproof that my second thoughts are often better than my 
 first thoughts - which is an indication, some people think, of a dangerous 
 instability of character... 
 
 Well it has happened again. I have played a low trick on my critics. I have 
 improved my plan and have thus slipt [sic] out of their net.87 
 
Having summarized the changes to the scheme, he went on to claim that 'this is the 
right socialist solution'. It was 'a planned social scheme, aimed at increasing equality 
and snatching new social advantages out of the exigencies of war.' He concluded, 
moreover, that his plan allowed liberty and the right to personal choice to be made 
harmonious with the welfare of the community as a whole: 'It is for the state to say 
how much a man may spend out of his earnings. It is for him to say how he will spend 
it.'88 
 
This, perhaps, was the crux of the difference between Keynes' philosophy and that of 
many of those within the Labour Movement who opposed him. For, even amongst 
those still attached, like Pethick-Lawrence, to nineteenth century ideas of laissez-faire, 
there were few Labour champions of the right to consumer choice. As Hugh Dalton 
had remarked to a Fabian conference in 1933, 'It was pedantic to think consumers' 
preference important so long as there was great poverty. A dictatorship of 
consumption was desirable.'89 The emergency of war made it doubly so; the 'pseudo-
remedy' of widespread rationing was supported by most socialists as representing 'fair 
shares' or 'equality of sacrifice'. Keynes's strictures against the shortages this would 
produce underestimated not only the British genius for queuing, but also the extent to 
which Labour had a genuine preference for direct physical controls as opposed to 
more subtle methods of macroeconomic management. Yet in spite of this underlying 
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philosophical difference, the Fabian lunch was a success, Keynes having 'a pretty 
strong impression that at least a majority were persuaded' and the word in Labour 
circles being positive.90 And on 27 February the book itself was published. 
 
How to Pay for the War 
 
Upon its launch, Keynes continued his vigorous propaganda campaign. He outlined 
his proposals to an all-party group of MPs, and again at the National Trade Union 
Club; he met the Chancellor and also gave a BBC broadcast.91 Furthermore, How to 
Pay for the War was greeted with near unanimous acclaim by economists of all 
shades, including Dennis Robertson, Hayek and Lionel Robbins. The dissentients 
were J.R. Hicks (who both feared evasions by the rich and thought the proposed 
family allowances too generous) and Michal Kalecki (who believed that the 
contribution that deferred pay would make to total savings would simply be offset by 
a reduction in voluntary savings).92 The plan was also supported by the Governor of 
the Bank of England and other important City figures. Keynes discovered in the press 
'an extraordinary and almost universal support'; outspoken opposition was restricted to 
Sir Robert Kindersley of the (voluntarist) National Savings Movement, Beaverbrook, 
and the Daily Worker.93 In the face of this general approval Keynes joked that 'after 
having tried all his life to remain unorthodox he now found orthodoxy always 
catching up with him, without even the decent time-lag of past days.'94 
 
Unsurprisingly, however, the reaction within the Labour Movement was more mixed. 
The New Statesman called on Labour to endorse Keynes's scheme, which was also 
welcomed by H.N. Brailsford in Reynolds News, G.D.H. Cole in Tribune and Richard 
Crossman in Left News.95 Barbara Wootton, whose economic works were influential 
within the Labour Party, reviewed the book favourably in the Political Quarterly.96 In 
TUC circles Keynes now counted amongst his supporters not only George Hicks and 
Jim Griffiths (an MP and a former union leader) but Citrine. But ominously, 'Bevin is 
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unapproachable, not only by myself but by everyone', and would not, in fact, break his 
silence until the end of March.97 The General Council itself, moreover, did not at this 
stage discuss deferred pay further, and did not even succeed in agreeing a statement 
supporting a drive for voluntary savings until the end of April, once it had received 
governmental assurance that new money lent to the nation up to £375  would be 
ignored for the purposes of the Means Test.98 On the positive side, the Ministry of 
Labour believed that, even though the TUC leaders could not imperil their own 
authority by admitting openly there should be no increases, Keynes's proposals had 
encouraged voluntary wage restraint by the unions.99 Yet conversely, one Inland 
Revenue official had previously reported to the Chancellor 'that two of the most 
influential of the Trade Union leaders have said that deductions from wages in 
pursuance of the plan would inevitably be followed by claims for equivalent and 
compensating increases in wages.'100 And there were further 'dark questionings' by the 
Labour Front Bench;101 Pethick-Lawrence was still havering, - he eventually came out 
against the plan - and A.V. Alexander, head of the Co-operative Movement, was 
openly opposed.102 
 
These Labour doubts were based in part on a continuing failure to see that economic 
conditions had changed since the slump. On the day after How to Pay for the War was 
published, Lord Snell, the party's leader in the House of Lords, refused to countenance 
any restriction in working class consumption whilst unemployment remained.103 As 
Keynes argued on the same day, to assume that this state of affairs would continue 
was to accept that the war effort was to fall far short of what it might be.104 But Snell 
was merely echoing Aneurin Bevan, who earlier in February had challenged 
economists: 'You can start your lectures when we have first maximised production in 
Great Britain', i.e. at the full employment level. There were still over a million 
unemployed; this was felt on the Labour side to be a symptom of the government's  
half-hearted and lackadaisical conduct of the war effort, which was thought to be 
lacking in planning and central direction. Meanwhile, restraints on luxury 
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consumption were thought to be insufficient. Such consumption should be reduced as 
a token of good faith: if, after this, it still proved necessary to reduce the standard of 
living of the workers, the question could be looked at again.105 
 
There were also vestiges in Labour circles of the trade unions' traditional opposition to 
family allowances, on the grounds that employers would use them as an excuse to 
depress wages,106 but this had not been raised at Keynes's meeting with the TUC, and 
the allowances were at any rate inessential to his scheme. The 'iron ration', too, 
aroused some limited controversy. As Bevan had put it, 'The proposition that steel 
workers, miners and engineers shall subsist upon this restricted margin of 
commodities, surrounded by the spectacle of war profiteers being able to buy goods at 
highly inflated prices, but still able to buy them, will never be accepted by the 
organised industrialists of this country.'107 This view was not universal, however. 
Another minor point was that Keynes had to spend much energy reiterating his belief 
that deferred pay should not be taken into consideration under the Means Test. Yet 
more substantial criticisms were also raised. 
 
Perhaps the most convincing of these was political, not economic. Ellen Wilkinson 
MP, the originator of the Jarrow March, argued that 'the Keynes Plan was a perfectly 
sound proposal if considered in vacuo, but that, in practice, it was impossible to 
consider it except in relation to the social and industrial circumstances in which...it 
would be carried into effect.' These circumstances consisted of the perceived class 
antagonism of the Chamberlain government, and the habit of capitalist governments in 
war-time of making, in exchange for sacrifices, promises to the workers which were 
subsequently broken. All Keynes's safeguards depended 'on the promise of a 
distinguished professor [sic] of economics - but not of the government who would 
have to implement them.'108 Keynes conceded, 'I would have no objection at all to your 
saying that, whilst you would not accept my safeguards from Mr. Chamberlain, you 
would accept them from a Government in which you had more confidence.'109 
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Wilkinson had attacked the plan apparently without having read it; most of her 
criticisms were ill-conceived, and Keynes managed to half-convert her. This was a 
potentially important coup, as she had by then been co-opted onto the NEC committee 
dealing with the scheme.110  
 
Another important issue was raised by a member of the secretarial staff of the 
National Union of Railwaymen, who wrote to Keynes in a private capacity noting that 
most trade union criticism of the plan was directed on the issue of  the security of the 
savings.111 Keynes admitted that this objection, also raised by Wilkinson amongst 
others, was difficult to meet, 'chiefly for the reason that there is so little that is definite 
behind it.' But the savings would be simply another part of the National Debt: 'There 
has never been a case of repudiation in this country, and I should have thought that 
political reasons alone would have made the position of deferred pay quite safe.'112 
There was, of course, a subsidiary point: assuming that the government did repay its 
debts, when would this happen, and after how much inflation?  In this respect the 
critics were ultimately shown to have had a degree of foresight: when a limited 
version of Keynes' scheme was in time put into place, the resultant 'post-war credits' 
depreciated heavily before they were eventually (and tardily) repaid. 
 
By contrast, when Ernest Bevin finally showed his hand, his criticisms of How to Pay 
for the War were less than brilliant. But the power of ideas is partly a function of the 
power of the person who has them, and after he declared his opposition to the plan it 
was unlikely that the rest of the TUC would overrule him, even had they favoured 
compulsory saving. Speaking in Cornwall on 28 March he said that there was 'grave 
danger' in the scheme, or any other like it, 'which might jerk the country out of its 
organised industrial life.' 'We have the proof that all our finely balanced negotiating 
machinery is standing the test of wartime conditions', he claimed. 'Then we get 
professors without experience of the reactions likely to be produced by their advice, 
seeking to promote fancy schemes.'113 (Ironically, Keynes had previously imagined the 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer himself deprecating 'fancy schemes'.114) 'Their schemes 
are likely to jolt the industrial machine, endanger production, and result in serious 
disturbances and strikes at a critical moment.'115 Bevin did not, in fact, manage to 
articulate precisely what his objection to compulsory saving was, save for a general 
distaste for compulsion itself; but his not-so-subtle threat to cause trouble were the 
scheme implemented would surely have put the government off adopting the plan, 
even had it been minded to in the first place. 
 
The Labour Party decides 
 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party NEC was determining its official position. This was a 
convoluted and time-consuming process. In January, the Press, Publicity and 
Campaign Sub-Committee, on which Laski served, had recommended a meeting with 
Keynes; this proposal was then shelved by the Policy Committee, which nonetheless 
agreed to meet specially to discuss the proposals. This meeting eventually took place 
on April 4, reached no conclusion, and then reconvened on April 11.116 Those present 
included Dalton, Attlee, Douglas Jay, Pethick-Lawrence, Wilkinson and Greenwood. 
The committee considered a document drafted by its secretary, G. Grant McKenzie, 
which analysed the Keynes scheme in detail. 
 
The plan was objected to first on grounds of administrative complexity; moreover, in 
order to enable deductions to be calculated 'it would require employers to be informed 
of the whole personal income and circumstances of all their employees', which 'would 
create grave objection and difficulty.' (This was in the days before PAYE.) It was 
acknowledged that Keynes had modified his scheme in response to criticism, but it 
was argued that his modifications left untouched both the problem of evasion by the 
rich, and the diversity of individual capacity to save.117 Furthermore, 'the adoption of 
the scheme would inevitably destroy the bulk of individual voluntary saving'; the 
likely net yield of genuine saving generated was thus estimated to be only £140 
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million, much lower than Keynes' aim of £550 million. Assuming this lower estimate 
'proved even approximately correct, the scheme would fail of its purpose, and would 
not in any way justify the upset it would cause', this being presumably a reference to 
Bevin's veiled threat of industrial action.118 
 
What, then, were the suggested alternatives? Unsurprisingly, the document focused on 
increased taxation of middle and higher incomes and war profits, as well as on 
rationing and the regulation of prices, and on a better organised scheme of voluntary 
saving: 'If, after these methods have been thoroughly tried, prices are not under control 
and inflation threatens, only then will it be necessary to consider whether compulsion 
is necessary and practicable.'119 There was, however, no mention of an annual capital 
tax during war-time. This was peculiar, in that such a tax was an important feature of 
the official policy pamphlet written by Douglas Jay, and of unofficial socialist thought 
too,120 although, as Stephen Brooke points out, this idea did not command unanimous 
support even in socialist spheres, Barbara Wootton in particular abjuring it on grounds 
of administrative complexity.121 At any rate, the committee subjected the document 
only to slight amendment before approving it. It was not, however, to be published, 
thus leaving a very slight opening for a future reversal in policy; but, to all intents and 
purposes, Keynes' attempt to make his plan 'outrageously attractive to the Labour 
Party' had now failed. 
 
A 'sophisticated and successful' campaign? 
 
Therefore, although Moggridge's contention that Keynes' propagandist campaign was 
sophisticated cannot be doubted, can it really be classed a success? Certainly, the 
system of deferred pay was eventually incorporated, as 'post-war credit', into the 
Budget of April 1941, albeit on a rather limited scale. Yet this came about not as a 
result of Keynes's original publicity drive, but only after he himself had been inducted 
into the Treasury in the summer of 1940 and was able to advise the new Chancellor, 
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Kingsley Wood, continuously and directly. This, in turn, was only made possible by 
the political changes of May, themselves brought about by the much larger 
circumstance of the military disaster in Norway. But as of the beginning of that 
month, Keynes was as far from achieving his objective as ever. 
 
For, whatever his success in converting public opinion, so doing was only a subsidiary 
aim of his propaganda: 'surely it is altogether impossible in a war to wait until 
everything is obvious and more than obvious to the man in the street', he wrote, 'If you 
wait so long as that, forces which one can no longer control will have been set 
moving.'122 But in fact, it was the political leaders, whose support he coveted, who 
remained immovable. At the end of January 1940, John Simon was saying privately 
that he would abolish food subsidies and 'let prices rip' if the trade unions continued to 
demand wage rises;123 and although this threat to unleash inflation may have been 
empty, his April Budget relied on voluntarism and increased taxation, offering nothing 
to restrain prices in the way in which Keynes would have wished. On the Labour side 
Keynes found many supporters but failed to break into the citadel. His friendly 
reception from the TUC did not lead to any official pronouncement in his favour: on 
17 March, the Reynolds News industrial correspondent, apparently apprised of the 
TUC’s attitude, reported that “Mr. J.M. Keynes’s plan for compulsory saving is dead 
so far as immediate practical politics is concerned.”124 The unions subsequently came 
out against compulsory saving on the ground that, even though it might be 
immediately economically necessary, it was likely to have undesirable (and unnamed) 
long-run political and economic consequences.125 Nor did Keynes's attempts to court 
the Labour Party Front Bench prevent the official (though private) rejection of his plan 
by the NEC. This body did not, in fact, burn its boats entirely on the issue, but by the 
beginning of May, as Moggridge acknowledges, Keynes's continued lack of success 
brought a change in tactics. As he told Liberal MP Clement Davies, 'there is a good 
deal to be said for concentrating on the inadequacy of the spending programme rather 
than on the inadequacy of the fiscal programme. If we can get what is wanted done in 
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the former respect, the inadequacy of the latter should be shown up.'126 This was, of 
course, an implicit admission that he had thus far failed to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of the fiscal programme either to the government or to the Opposition. 
 
So why was it that Keynes, in spite of all his concessions, had failed to get his plan 
adopted by the Labour Movement? He himself speculated that his  'incorrigible' 
Labour opponents were simply weak-minded: 'I suppose the trouble is that they have 
entirely lost any possibility of concentration, and there is nothing on earth they are 
prepared really to give their mind to.'127 Yet even were one to accept this damning 
verdict in its entirety, it would still be only a partial explanation. It is possible to 
wonder further if Keynes' charm offensive, for all its sweet reasonableness, came a 
little late for the Labour Front Bench. As recently as January 1939, he had publicly 
described the official leadership as behaving like 'sectaries of an outworn creed 
mumbling moss-grown demi-semi-Fabian Marxism'.128 It is perhaps not inconceivable 
that they might have taken offence. But again, this cannot be the whole answer. 
 
It is thus necessary to turn again to the pronounced ideological differences between 
Keynes and the Labour Movement. These, of course, cannot serve as an entire 
explanation; both Laski and Bevan, for example, shared a similar marxian outlook, 
but the former approved Keynes's plan whereas the latter did not. But the attitude to 
the scheme held by Attlee, Bevin and others does suggest a wide disparity between the 
Labour leadership's economic viewpoint and that of Keynes. On this evidence it is 
difficult to fully accept Elizabeth Durbin's conclusion that by 1939 the majority within 
the Labour Party understood the importance of the Keynesian message for 
socialism.129 The fact that, on occasion, Keynes himself barely received courtesy from 
Labour leaders is suggestive; but more significant was the general socialist preference 
for specific controls on consumption as opposed to the more general demand 
management represented by compulsory saving. Even Douglas Jay, perhaps the most 
consciously 'Keynesian' of Labour economists, proved unable to accept Keynesian 
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precepts when these were aimed at reducing demand rather than expanding it. 
Moreover, the Keynes scheme's supporters within the Labour Movement hankered 
after physical control as well -  for Richard Crossman compulsory saving was 'not a 
substitute for a Labour plan of war-economy', but one feature of a plan which should 
feature price-fixing, rationing, and unified control of food production 'if possible on 
the basis of the nationalization of the land'.130  
 
It must not be forgotten, moreover, that Labour's leaders always had their eyes on 
what was politically popular. 'I don't know if it is good economics, remarked Emanuel 
Shinwell MP of the April 1939 'Conscription of Wealth' proposal, 'but it certainly 
sounds good politics to me.'131 This stood too for the similar solutions put forward by 
Labour after the outbreak of war. By contrast, one must suppose that Keynes's ideas 
were ultimately judged not to be 'good politics'. At a less cynical level, it is also 
possible to appreciate Labour leaders' genuine concern for the condition of the 
workers at a time when wages were already falling behind prices, and when large-
scale unemployment still remained: compulsory saving could easily be seen as yet one 
more sacrifice at a difficult time. Furthermore, Keynes believed that a long war was 
necessary, and that within a reasonably short time it would involve total economic 
mobilisation. This was not equally clear to everyone. As Bevan told the Commons at 
the end of April, before the details and repercussions of the Norwegian disaster were 
known, 'Mr. Keynes himself pointed out that the necessity for his plan does not arise 
until the nation's resources are fully employed. So long as we have 1,000,000 men and 
2,000,000 women who might be employed in an extremity, it does not seem to me that 
this House is called upon to consider the details of Mr. Keynes's plan.'132 Thus as long 
as the war appeared to be 'Phoney', and the economic effort involved half-hearted, it 
seemed to some Labour thinkers correspondingly less necessary to worry about how to 




Together, these various reasons do much to explain why, by April 1940, Keynes had 
failed to win the Labour Movement's acceptance of his plan. But the truly defining 
factor was the political situation more generally. For, whilst Chamberlain and Simon, 
seen by the Labour Movement as representatives of the class war, remained in their 
respective positions, it was impossible for Keynes to succeed. Even had their 
government sponsored his plan, Labour would have rejected it; a fact which in turn 
prevented the government adopting it in the first place. But Churchill's accession to 
power changed all this. By August, the Labour Party was prepared to examine the 
issue afresh.133 By October, Greenwood, of all people, now Minister without Portfolio, 
was himself advocating forced saving.134 The following spring, Kingsley Wood's 
Budget, which included a version of Keynes's scheme, was warmly welcomed by all 
the main political parties  (although the TUC remained opposed to compulsory 
saving). 
 
Why this change of heart? To begin with, it was clearly now easier for the Labour 
Movement to accept assurances about the security of deferred pay from a government 
in which, with Attlee, Greenwood and Bevin in important positions, it was generously 
represented. Second, as the economy became more fully mobilised, the rapid 
reduction of unemployment rendered redundant the argument that action against 
inflation was as yet unnecessary. Furthermore, the Treasury scheme, as put into effect, 
was on a notably small scale, yielding only £125 million a year: 'It was thus more of 
an experiment than the centrepiece of war finance', in Moggridge's words.135 The 
corollary of this, of course, was that the scheme was merely the junior partner to large-
scale rationing and profits-limitation exercises - war finance methods that the Labour 
Movement very much approved. The concession of principle involved, if any, was 
therefore slight. 
 
Ultimately, the, Keynes' propagandist campaign was not, on its own terms, successful 
- except to the extent that, if indeed at all, its educative value encouraged voluntary 
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wage restraint by the unions. This was in spite of the campaign's sophistication, and in 
spite of Keynes's willingness to adjust his ideas in order to get his plan accepted. 
Indeed, before May 1940, the political conditions for the scheme's acceptance did not 
exist. If, after Keynes returned to the Treasury, the story turned out to have a 
reasonably happy ending, he had, in the meantime, be shown an important lesson 
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